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NOTES

The Agreement

The third limitation on scope is perhaps the easiest to deal with.
The agreement itself may limit the arbitral scope depending upon
the intention of the parties as evidenced by the type of agreement
employed. A problem of interpretation of the clause, be it general
or specific, arises here. The courts seem to have formulated a workable rule for this problem: arbitrators may interpret and select any
meaning which a reasonably intelligent person would accept,
9 5 but a
meaning which no intelligent person would accept is void.
Conclusion
As has been indicated the scope of a "future disputes" arbitration agreement may be broad or restricted, but in either case problems abound. Since questions of law under most of the American
arbitration statutes are determined in the arbitration itself, the
lawyer's significance is felt in the period when the contract is made.
Therefore, the best method of removing barriers and of gaining effective arbitration is through expert draftsmanship in drawing the
agreement. The penalty for failure in this respect is severe because
the benefits of the arbitration process are otherwise lost in the milieu
of arbitration, coupled with litigation.

THE TAXATION OF QUALIFIED ANNUITY PLANS AND DEFERRED
COMPENSATION AGREEMENTS TO THE EMPLOYEE
AND His BENEFICIARY

The effect of our progressive tax structure is to foster plans
which defer compensation to future years. Arrangements which
mitigate the effect of our high marginal rates have been sought after
with much vigor.' These plans are not inequitable. They provide
more spendable income and at a time in the future when the individual's productive capacity has been curtailed. In recognition of
this the Internal Revenue Service in March, 1960 promulgated
Revenue Ruling 60-31 outlining the use of deferred compensation
plans. This article will consider the deferred compensation arrange95 Marceau, Are All Interpretations"Admissible",

(1957).

12 Ama. J. (n.s.) 151

'For leading cases involving deferred compensation plans, see Casale v.
Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Commissioner v. Oates, 207 F.2d
711 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Howard Veit, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 811 (1949).
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ments available under this Ruling. As a background, however, it will
be well to consider the sections of the Code relating to qualified deferred compensation plans.
In order to prevent qualified plans from being used exclusively
for high-salaried employees, 2 Congress in 1939 adopted section 165 3
establishing the requirements for these plans in order to qualify for
tax benefits. 4 Because of the complexity of provisions in many pension plans, each one is sui generis, and it is difficult to determine in
advance whether a particular plan will qualify under the Code. The
Internal Revenue Service has promulgated guides and adopted procedures whereby the employer seeks advice from the Service in establishing his plan to insure that it is a qualified one.5
The general requirement for qualification is that there be a plan,
which means a definite written program with a view to permanence. 6
This general requirement insures that the plan in operation meets
the conditions of the written plan as qualified; 7 that the employee
benefits under the plan may be definitely determinable; 8 and that
the plan is not merely established during years when profits are good. 9
The basic requirement for qualification is that the plan be maintained for the exclusive benefit of the employees 10 or their beneficiaries."
As specifically provided in the Code, this means first
2 H.R. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
"The coverage and discrimination requirements would operate to safeguard the public against the use
of the pension plan as a tax avoidance device by management groups seeking
to compensate themselves without paying their appropriate taxes." Id. at 50.
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 165, 53 Stat. 67 (now INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 401).
4 There is a belief that these provisions discriminate in favor of salaried

employees and against self-employed individuals. See Note, 66 HARv. L. Ray.
1105 (1953).
5 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 56-12, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 1029. A current revised
pamphlet has also been made available as a guide for qualification. Announcement 59-64, 1959 INT. REv. BULL. No. 27, at 28. Determination applications
are processed by specially trained reviewers assigned to the audit divisions
of the District Directors' offices. The work of the district offices is supervised and coordinated by the Pension Trust Section of the Tax Rulings Division under the Assistant Commissioner, Technical, in the national office in
Washington.
- Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 128, 130-31, 133. The plan generally establishes a trust to administer the program, but there may be nontrusteed plans in the case of employee purchased annuities. Rev. Rul. 56-633,
1956-2 CuM. BULL. 279. For a recent ruling reaffirming the requirement of
a written document see Rev. Rul. 59-402, 1959 INT. REv. BULL. No. 51, at 12.
7 Disqualification may result if the plan in operation varies from the
written plan as previously approved. See Time Oil Co. v. Commissioner,
258 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1958).
8 Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CUM. BULL. 128, 133.
9 See Rev. Rul. 55-60, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 37.
10 Employees may include attorneys or other practitioners but not partners.
Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 128, 134.
11 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a). It is well to note, however, that a
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that the trust instrument makes it impossible for the employer to
divert any of the income or corpus of the trust to his own business.
If termination becomes necessary, the employer must satisfy all of
the fixed
and contingent rights of the employees covered under the
2
plan.'
The next requirement is that of coverage. The Code makes two
specific provisions as to coverage; the plan must cover either a stated
percentage of employees 13 or a classification of employees which in
the opinion of the Commissioner does not discriminate in favor of
14
officers, executives, shareholders, or highly compensated personnel.
The percentage requirement, in essence, provides a minimum necessary coverage of fifty-six per cent 15 of all employees. In lieu of
meeting these percentage requirements, an employer may set up a
classification of employees to be covered if found by the Commissioner
not to be discriminatory. Generally, plans may qualify which are
limited to employees within a prescribed age group, with a stated
number of years of service, or who work in designated departments
provided of course that these are not discriminatory.' 6
There is an element of discrimination built into the operation
of a qualified pension plan. This occurs in the area of the amount
of benefits derived under the plan. Employer contributions are based
on a fixed percentage of the total compensation paid or accrued to
the employees covered by the plan.1 A participant's pension benefits
under the plan may be computed with relation to the employer's contributions which was based on his total compensation.' 8 Since officers and executives generally are paid more than ordinary employees,
their benefits will be proportionately greater. 19 This element of discrimination will not cause disqualification, however. 20

plan providing for benefits solely to the beneficiary does not meet this requirement. Rev. Rul. 56-656, 1956-2 Cum. BuLL. 280.
12 No reversion at all is permitted to the employer for profit-sharing or
stock-bonus plans. In the case of pension trusts the employer may take any
surplus existing because of an actuarial error. Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 Cum.
BuLu. 128, 138.
13 IT.
Rav. CODE oF 1954, § 401(a) (3) (A). Short-term, seasonal, or parttime employees are not included for the purposes of coverage. Ibid. Hereinafter all Code sections will be from the 1954 Code unless otherwise indicated.
'4 CODE § 401(a) (3) (B).
15 80% of all eligible employees must be covered if 70% or more of the
employees are eligible for coverage. Specifically excluded from such computation are seasonal, part-time and recently hired employees. § 401 (a) (3) (A).

16 See Rev. Rul. 59-14, 1959-1 Cum. BULL 84.
17 CODE § 404(a).
There is at present no requirement that a specific formula be adopted prior to qualification fixing the percentage contributions under
a profit-sharing or stock-bonus plan. Rev. Rul. 56-366, 1956-2 Cum. BuLL.
976. See also Commissioner v. Produce Reporter Co., 207 F.2d 586 (7th Cir.
1953); Lincoln Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1951).
8sRev. Rul. 59-13, 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 83.
29 Ibid.
20 Ibid. The previous ruling that contributions for the benefit of employee-
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A plan may be disqualified if it requires burdensome contributions to be made by the employees themselves. A qualified plan may
allow an employee to contribute to the plan from his own compensation where such a feature is to encourage savings. Formerly, it was
held that where such contributions would exceed six per cent of the
employee's compensation, this would discriminate in favor of highsalaried personnel. 21 This six per cent rule has been amplified and
now an employee may be allowed to contribute up to ten per cent
of his compensation provided
employer contributions are not geared
22
to these contributions.
There is no specific requirement for qualification that an employee be granted an immediate vested right in his employer's contributions.2 3 A reasonable minimum number of years of service may
be required before the employee's rights become fully vested. There
is a stipulation, however, that the rights of the employee become
fully vested upon reaching normal retirement age.24 The granting
of vested rights again cannot discriminate in favor of high-salaried
personnel. 25 With relation to the amount of the contributions in
which the employee has a vested right, provision may be made for
the granting of loans to the employee up to the extent of his vested
interest. 26
Distinctions Between the Plans
There are three types of plans provided for in the Code, pension,
profit-sharing and stock-bonus plans. 27 A pension plan is a fixed
debt of the employer in that his contributions are determined actuarily on the basis of providing definitely determinable benefits to
the employee on retirement. Pension plans are established specifically for the employee's retirement, and thus such benefits as accident
or hospitalization insurance may not be included since they are not

shareholders could not exceed 30% of total contributions (I.T. 3674, 1944
Cum. BuLL. 315, 316) has been revoked in light of the Commissioner's acquies-

cence in the case of Volckening, Inc. v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 723 (1949).
I.T. 4020, 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 61, 62.
21
2 2 Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CuM. BuLL. 128, 141-42.
Rev. Rul. 59-185, 1959 INT. REV. BULL. No. 21, at 11.
23 Rev. Rul. 57-163, mtpra note 21, at 146.
See also Rev. Rul. 55-186,
1955-1 CuM. BULL. 39, where employees are given a vested interest in con-

tributions upon discontinuance of employment. The requirements of vesting
may differ depending on whether a pension, profit-sharing, or stock-bonus plan
is adopted. See Goldstein, Pensions And Profit-SharingPlans: FallaciesAnd

Facts, TAxEs 71, 74 (Jan. 1960).
24 Rev. Rul. 57-163, supra note 21, at 147.

Ibid.
Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 Cum. BuL. 128, 152. There must be specific
provision made, however, for the giving of security to repay the loan; otherwise
the loan may be regarded as a distribution. Ibid.
27 CODE, § 401(a).
25

26
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considered within the purview of a retirement plan.28 Under a profitsharing plan, on the other hand, employer's contributions must be
geared to profits and must be entirely dependent upon profits.2 9 A
profit-sharing plan is not a retirement plan in that the only provision
is that there be an accumulation of funds for a fixed number of
years.30 Since a profit-sharing plan is not a retirement fund, there
is no restriction against accident or health provisions being incorporated in the plan.31 A stock-bonus plan is similar to the profitsharing arrangement in that it is not primarily a retirement program.
The only provision is again that there be an accumulation for a fixed
number of years. However, employer's contributions to a stockbonus plan are not based on profits or dependent upon them. Any
distributions from the stock-bonus plan must be exclusively in the

stock of the employer company.32
The distinguishing feature of the three types of plans is the
amount of deductions the employer is allowed for his contributions.3 3
Under the pension plan, contributions and deductions are based on
actuarial cost, but the Code provides a maximum limitation of five
per cent of the total compensation paid or accrued to the employees
covered by the plan.3 4 Contributions to a profit-sharing or stockbonus 31 arrangement are limited to fifteen per cent of the total compensation paid or accrued to the employees covered.3 6 In the case of
a plan having both pension and profit-sharing features, the maximum
limitation is twenty-five per cent.3 7 Carryovers to subsequent years
are allowed for contributions in excess of the allowable maximums
in any year.38

2s Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (i)
29 Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v.
30

(1954).
Commissioner, 29 T.C. 1248 (1958).
What is a fixed number of years has not been answered. Ibid. There
is a ruling that a fixed number of years is at least two years. Rev. Rul.
54-231, 1954-1 Cum. BuLL. 150.
31 See note 28 supra.
32 Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (b) (1) (iii) (1954). The distributions cannot be of
stock of another corporation, affiliated or not. It would appear that a stockbonus plan is limited to a corporation. But see § 7701 (3), wherein the definition of corporations under the 1954 Code includes associations.
33 All contributions are deductible only in the year when paid. § 404(a).
Accrual basis taxpayers may take a deduction in the prior year if made before
filing their return. § 404(a) (6). Also, the availability of a deduction is
limited to section 404 and cannot be taken under sections 162 or 212.
34 CODE § 404(a) (1) (A). The Commissioner may lower the maximum if
he finds that the amounts are unreasonable. Also any dividends earned from
the fund will lower the contribution limitation. Rev. Rul. 60-33, 1960 INT.
REv.
BULL No. 5, at 15.
3

GIt is sometimes difficult to compute the deduction under a stock-bonus
plan because of the difficulty in placing a value on the stock especially in small
corporations.
36
CODE § 404(a) (3) (A).
3
7 CODE § 404(a) (7).
38 CoDE § 404(d).
In the case of a plan having both pension and profit-
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The primary benefit of these plans to the employer is their use
in fostering good employee relations. The pension plan is especially
adaptable in encouraging the retirement of superannuated employees.
On the other hand, profit-sharing and stock-bonus programs are basic
methods of providing incentives in the form of a share in the profits
and in the business. Even in the executive ranks plans such as these
provide incentives.3 9
While the employer is benefiting from good employee relations,
there are definite tax advantages available to him. His contributions
to the fund are deductible currently when made, and he need not wait
for the actual distribution of the benefits to the employee as in a
non-qualified plan.40 Further, any income earned by a trust41administering the plan from the contributions is exempt from tax.
Taxation of Qualified Plans to the Employee
As originally put, the main purpose of the qualified plan is to
allow the employee to defer his compensation to the future along
with the incidence of taxation when his earning power has declined
and he is in a lower tax bracket. This is accomplished by postponing
the employee's tax on the employer's contributions until the benefits
are actually distributed or made available to him. 42 Premiums on
any life insurance protection purchased by the plan which is payable
to the beneficiary of the employee is included currently in the gross
income of the employee in the year such premiums are paid. Howpaid on group term life insurance would not be
ever, premiums
43
includible.
Distributions of benefits from the plan are taxed as an annuity
under section 72 of the Code. 44 Total distributions are not entitled
to the three-year tax spread provided under that section, because,
as will be seen, long-term capital gains treatment is available for
lump sum distributions. Any contributions made by the employee
from compensation which was taxable to him at the time are excluded
from gross income when distributed. This is done by means of an
sharing features, the maximum deduction is raised to 30%7 if carryovers exist
from prior years. Note 37 supra.
39 See Rice, Incentives for Executives of Small Corporations, 32 TAXES
222 (1954).
40 CODE § 404.
41 CODE § 501 (a). The employer need not set up a trust in establishing his
plan. In such a case, however, the income of the fund would be taxable to
him. See, e.g., CODE § 502 (feeder organizations). In practice, therefore, it
to establish a trust to administer the plan.
is customary
42
CODE § 402(a).
43 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (2) (1954).
44 CODE § 402(a) (1).
"Made available" means when credited to the employee's account with an unrestricted right to withdraw such payment. Rev.
Rul. 54-265, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 239.
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exclusion ratio. 45 The exclusion ratio is the proportion the employee's contributions bear to the expected return under the contract
as of the annuity starting date. 46 The expected return is figured on
the life expectancy of the employee determined actuarily. 47 To simplify the computation of the tax,48 the Code provides that if the
employee's contributions are recoverable in three years from the
annuity starting date, then there is no tax until the total amount of
his contributions are recovered. 49 Thereafter all amounts received
are taxable in full.
A seemingly unrationalized provision in the Code" authorizes
long-term capital gains treatment for total distributions which become
payable in one taxable year on account of the employee's death or
other separation from service. 51 The gain on such a distribution is
the excess of the payment over the employee's contributions less his
contributions previously distributed which were excluded from gross
income. Tile total distributions need not actually be paid out in one
year,5 as
long as they become payable and are made available in one
2
year.
The Code provides further preferential treatment by allowing
any unrealized appreciation in securities of the employer corporation 53 to escape tax on distribution to the employee if the securities
are part of a total distribution or if the securities are purchased with
an amount considered to have been contributed by the employee for
the purchase of such securities. 4 The reason for this latter provision
is to provide the distributee (employee or his beneficiary) with the
45

§ 72(b).
If the employee retires at age 60 with benefits under the contract of
$2,000 a year until death, and his life expectancy is 10 years (as determined
.by the Regulations) the total expected return is $20,000. If he had made contributions totalling $4,000, there would be an exclusion ratio of 4,000/20,000
-or 1/5. Thus out of every yearly payment $400 is excluded from gross in,come. This introduces an element of wager since the exclusion continues even
after his life expectancy has been exceeded, so he may exclude more than
his actual contribution if he outlives his life expectancy, or less if he should
-die before reaching his life expectancy.
47 CODE § 72(c) (2) (C).
48 This also eliminates the element of wager.
4
9 CODE § 72(d).
5
9 Eckerman, The Unrationalized Capital Gains Treatment of Lump-Sumn
TerminationDistributionsUnder Qualified Pension, Profit-Sharing and Annuity
.Plans,7 SYRAcUSE L. Rnv. 1 (1955).
51 CoDE § 402(a) (2).
52 It is this availability of shifting ordinary income into capital gain that
has met with disapproval. See Sporn, Some Proposed Revisions of the Pro-visions of the Internal Revenue Code Governing the Taxation of Deferred
Compensation Arrangements, 14 TAx L. Rav. 289, 303 (1959). It can be justified, however, on the grounds that it eliminates the unfortunate effects of
-bunching.
53 Employer corporation includes parent or subsidiary corporation.
CODE
:. 402(a)
(3) (B).
54
CODE § 402(a) (2).
46

CODE
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same basis as if the employee himself had bought the securities. Any
gain realized by the distributee in a subsequent taxable transaction
is taxed as a long-term capital gain.
The taxation of the employee on annuities purchased for him
under a qualified plan is the same. 55 The annuity is taxed only when
distributed or made available to him. Long-term capital gains treatment is also available on lump sum distributions payable by reason
of the employee's death.56
Taxation of Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans
Non-qualified plans are plans which have not met the requirements of section 401 and thus are not available for the tax advantages provided. However, the new Service Ruling 60-31 has removed most of the tax disadvantages from non-qualified plans. They
are now substantially equal to qualified plans. Discrimination no
longer must be safeguarded against, so the non-qualified plan will
operate specifically as deferred compensation arrangements for
executives, officers and key-employees. Deferred compensation arrangements provide a form of additional compensation but are57 designed to soften the impact of the high progressive surtax rates.
The 1954 Code makes no mention of these deferred compensation plans. Their income tax effects are not determined specifically
with relation to the Code sections dealing with pension plans.58 The
tax liabilities of these plans are determined under the Code sections
and the taxable year in which items
relating to accounting methods
59
of gross income are included.
In discussing the tax liability of the executive for whose benefit
the plan is inaugurated, he is considered to be operating on the cash
receipts and disbursements method, which would be the common
practice for an individual taxpayer. Although under the cash receipts and disbursements method a person is not taxed on income
60
until he receives it, there is the doctrine of constructive receipt.
55

CODE § 403 (a).
56 CODE § 403(a) (2).

.5 The general purpose of such an arrangement is as follows:
Suppose a
key-employee is currently paid a salary of $30,000 a year. A $10,000 salary
increase is contemplated. If taxpayer is married, he will keep about $4,700
out of the increase. Instead of paying the employee presently, the employer
agrees to pay him $10,000 a year commencing at age 65 if the executive remains with the company until that time, agrees to render consulting services,
and agrees not to compete after retirement. On retirement at age 65, assuming
the executive has $6,000 of retirement income of his own, the $10,000 paid
now will result in his keeping over $7,000. Also after age 65 there is the
additional old age exemption of $600 and a retirement income credit. There
is a possible tax-saving of $2,300.
58 CODE §§ 401-04, 501.
59
CoDE §§446(c), 451(a).
80 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Oates, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953); Howard
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Under this doctrine a taxpayer is deemed to have income though not
actually reduced to his possession if the income has been set apart
for him or credited to him and he can demand payment or draw on
the account without restriction.61 The doctrine of economic benefit
also upsets many deferred payment arrangements. 62 Under this doctrine an employee may have current taxable income if the employer's
grant of benefits in the future has a present value.6
Revenue Ruling 60-31
Formerly, the tax effects of a deferred compensation plan depended entirely upon circumventing these two doctrines. If the court
found an arm's length transaction with sufficient contingencies provided to keep the executive's rights forfeitable, he would not be taxed
currently on the income.6
If constructive receipt were found because his rights were considered nonforfeitable, the executive was
taxed currently.6 5 This would be especially prejudicial since he does
not have the funds currently with which to pay the tax. This confusion is no longer the situation. A new Ruling by the Internal
Revenue Service has authorized these deferred compensation plans
and does not apply the doctrine of constructive receipt to plans that
meet the requirements of the Ruling. 66 To a great extent, also, the
ruling does not require the executive's right to be forfeitable.
The Ruling is adapted around an acquiescence in the case of
Commissioner v. Oates, 67 a leading case involving the deferment of
compensation. There are five fact patterns discussed in the ruling,
each involving an attempt to postpone the receipt of income. 68 Two
examples involve an employer and a key-employee and both are successful in deferring the tax to the year the income is actually received.
Both plans are formal contractuid arrangements whereby the employer
Veit, 8 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 811 (1949). For a complete list of the contingencies recognized to prevent vesting see Pomeroy, Real Contingencies Itnportant in Utqualified Pension Plans-And Beware of Funding, J. TAXATION
110, 111 (Feb. 1959).
61 Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957); Drysdale v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. No. 37 (May 22, 1959); Deupree v. Commissioner, 1 T.C.
113 (1942).
62 Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244 (1951), aff'd, 194 F.2d 541 (6th
Cir. 1952).
63 Many of these cases arise where the employer purchases a commercial
annuity to provide the funds in the future. See, e.g., Morse v. Commissioner,
202 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1953); Hackett v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 121 (1st
Cir. 1946); Brodie v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 275 (1942).
64
65

Note 60 supra.
Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960

Note 61 supra.

INT. REV. BULL.
67 207 F2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953).
(6

No. 5, at 17.

68 The first three examples are successful in deferring the tax. The remaining two are not successful. Note 66 supra.
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promises to pay additional compensation in the present, receipt by
the employee to be postponed to the future.
The first is an example of a retirement plan under which fixed
amounts are credited to a bookkeeping reserve account. Distributions are to be made to the taxpayer-employee "upon (a) termination of the taxpayer's employment by the corporation; (b) the
taxpayer's becoming a part-time employee of the corporation; or
(c) the taxpayer's becoming partially or totally incapacitated." 69
The contract need not provide for the forfeiture by the taxpayer of
his right to distributions and even if the taxpayer refuses or fails to
perform his duties, the corporation may be relieved of any obligation to make further credits, "but not of the obligation to distribute
amounts previously contributed." Death benefits are provided if the
taxpayer should die before receiving all his benefits in the account.
Under this plan it is not necessary at all to make the executive's
rights contingent or forfeitable. He does not lose the credits once
made to the account even if he subsequently fails or refuses to perform his services. Constructive receipt is guarded against by providing that distributions are to be made only on the happening of
the enumerated events and not before. There is no indication whether
70
the bookkeeping reserve account is to be funded or unfunded.
Probably, this will not affect the tax liability of the executive, but it
might well affect the availability of a deduction to the corporation. 71
The second example set forth in the Ruling is a profit-sharing
plan which provides additional compensation based on a percentage
of the employer's profits in excess of a stated minimum. This plan
is even more liberal in that it allows the amounts to be credited to
the separate account of each individual participant in the plan, and
any investment income from the fund created is also credited to the
participant's account. Distributions are to begin when the employee
"(1) reaches age 60, (2) is no longer employed by the company,
including cessation of the employrhent due to death, or (3) becomes
totally disabled to perform his duties, whichever occurs first." 72
Certain contingencies are provided which may relieve the corporation from making any distributions from the accounts. These contingencies are the same formal ones that have been recognized in
the past, 73 namely, that (1) the employee refrain from entering into

69

Note 66 supra.

In strict accounting terminology a reserve would not be funded as in a
reserve for depreciation or a reserve for bad debts.
71 See Diamond, Tax Aspects of Nonqualified Pension and Deferred Pay-ment Plans, 32 TAXES 615, 617. See also Pomeroy, Real Contingeiwies Imtportant int Unqualified Pension Plans-And Beware of Funding, J. TAXATioN
110 (Feb. 1959). The deductibility of the contributions will be discussed infra
70

note 87.
72 Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960
73

Note 71 supra.

IN.

REv. BuLL. No. 5, at 18.
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a competing business on retirement, (2) the employee be available
to render consulting services after retirement, and (3) he make no
attempt to borrow on his beneficial interest in the plan. If the employee dies before exhausting all the funds in his account, his beneficiary will receive the amount remaining.
While this profit-sharing plan does provide some contingencies
and does contain an element of forfeitability, the contingencies called
for are more formal than real: an incapacitated person will not
readily enter into a competing business or be able to make himself
available to render consulting services. Again, constructive receipt is
guarded against by providing for distribution only on the happening
of certain events.
This ruling represents a major change in policy for the Internal
Revenue Service. 74 It is more than a surrender in an area where
the courts have not always favored the Commissioner's contentions.
The Service has outlined well-reasoned plans which allow formal
contractual arrangements to bind the employer whereby funds are
actually set aside to the separate account of the individual executive
without constructive receipt, economic benefit, or nonforfeitable rights
frustrating the purpose. The reasoning of the Service stresses the
fact that a mere promise to pay does not give rise to constructive
receipt or economic benefit. 75 A second reason which was expressly
mentioned as distinguishing a successful plan from an unsuccessful
one is that no trusts were created and there was no intent76that the
employer should hold the funds in trust for the employee.
There is no provision in these plans for long-term capital gains
treatment for lump sum distributions as in a qualified plan. 77 However, there is a provision in the Code allowing a three-year tax
spread for lump sum distributions under an annuity or retirement
contract. 78 This provision is expressly disallowed for qualified
plans, 79 but there is no similar restriction for non-qualified plans.
This three-year averaging provision may be available for any lump
sum distributions from these deferred compensation agreements if
these arrangements are considered an annuity under section 72.
It is submitted that the plans suggested in the ruling be closely
followed in adopting a deferred compensation arrangement. No ad-

74 See Rev. Rul. 57-37, 1957-1 Cum. BULL.. 18, as modified by Rev. Rul.
57-528, 1957-2 Cum. Buu.m 263. See also 12 CCH, Tax Saving Compensation
Plais, STAND. FED. TAX RE'. Pt. 1, at 5 (March 2, 1960).

75 Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 5, at 17, 20. This is similar
to the non-commercial annuity under which the tax is postponed to the year

of receipt because the value of the promise depends on the continued solvency
of the promisor. See Estate of Bertha Kann, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 787
aff'd, 174 F2d 357 (3d Cir. 1949).
(1947),
7
6 Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 5, at 17, 21.
7 Id. at 21-22.
8
7 CODE § 72(e) (3).
79 CODE

§ 402(a).
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vance determinations will be issued to decide the tax consequences
of a specific plan.80 It is submitted further that the plan in operation
meet the requirements of the contractual arrangement as written to
avoid a finding that the transaction was a sham.
There are two important questions left open by the ruling. The
first is: will the income of the fund created be taxed presently to the
corporation? The retirement plan makes no mention of a fund or
any income from it. The profit-sharing plan does make provision
for a fund and states that "each account is also credited with the net
amount, if any, [of income] realized from investing any portion of
the amount in the account." 81 It would seem that without express
provision not to tax such income, it cannot be implied that the Service
desired to exempt it. The ruling expressly states that the amounts
are not being held by the corporation in trust for the employee. The
fund, therefore, still belongs to the corporation subject to a liability.
with the
The corporation as the owner of the funds should be taxed
82
income from it in the absence of an express exemption.
The second question deals with the deductibility of the contributions by the employer. There is no problem with unfunded plans
since the ruling expressly allows a deduction when the contributions are paid to the employee. The ruling refers to section
404(a) (5) of the 1954 Code which allows the employer a current
deduction for his contributions only if the employee's rights in the
contributions are nonforfeitable at the time. 3 Where his rights are
forfeitable, there is no current deduction for the employer. Moreover, if the plan is a funded one the employer may not be allowed a
deduction for any taxable year, even when paid to the employee.84
This general rule as to deductibility may result in different treatment for the retirement plan and the profit-sharing plan. The differences arise on the basis of the contingencies in the contracts to
which the employee's rights are subject. Under the retirement plan,
the employee's rights are not subject to any contingencies; his rights
vest immediately upon the credit being made to the account. His
rights, therefore, are nonforfeitable and the corporation is expressly
allowed a deduction under section 404(a) (5).85 Under the profit-

80 Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960 INT. REV. BULL. No. 5,at 23.

81 Id.at 17, 18.
82 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
83 CoDE §404(a) (5).
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-12 (1956). "Ifan amount ispaid during the
taxable year to a trust or under a plan and the employee's rights to such
amounts are forfeitable at the time the amount is paid, no deduction is
allowable for any taxable year." Ibid.
85 "Contributions made ... shall be deductible .. .by the employer making
such contribution . . . in the taxable year when paid, if the plan is not one
included in paragraph (1), (2), or (3), [referring to qualified plans] if the
employees' rights to or derived from such employer's contribution or such
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sharing arrangement, however, the ruling makes the employee's rights
to distributions contingent upon certain conditions the employee must
meet. An employee's right is forfeitable when there is a contingency
under the plan which may cause the employee to lose his right in the
contribution. If this regulation as to forfeitability be followed strictly,
it will result in the deduction for contributions being disallowed to
the employer. However, a valid argument can be made to prove that
the employee's rights under the profit-sharing plan are nonforfeitable
also. The contingencies provided in this plan are conditions subsequent.8 6 The employee does have a present right in the contributions and he will receive distributions from the separate account
maintained for him unless he breaches the agreement by performing
certain prohibited acts. Moreover, these contingencies are illusory
in the sense that the plan allows distributions to commence, in any
case, upon the death of the employee, or upon his becoming totally
incapacitated. Under such conditions, it is apparent that his availability to render consulting services or his refraining from competing
businesses are not the elements upon which his rights depend.
This discussion is more than academic when there are recent
Service rulings to the effect that the employer's contributions to a
funded plan are not deductible for any taxable year if the employee's
rights under the plan are forfeitable. This means that there are no
deductions even when distributions are made to the employees.87 This
position of the Service is found also in the ruling dealing with deferred compensation plans where it is said:
In the application of those sections [referring to section 404(a) (5) of the
Code and section 1.404(a)-12 of the Regulations] to unfunded plans, no deduction is allowable for any compensation paid or accrued by an employer on
account of any employee . . . except in the year when paid.

.

."

88

The express restriction of this deduction to unfunded plans may be
considered a reaffirmance of its position not to allow a deduction for
contributions to funded plans in any taxable year even when distributions are made, if the employee's rights in the plan were forfeitable.

compensation are nonforfeitable at the time the contribution or compensation
is paid." (Emphasis added.) CoDE § 404(a) (5).
86 The conditions are that the employee (1) refrain from engaging in a
competing business after retirement, (2) make himself available to render
consulting services after retirement, (3) refrain from borrowing on his beneficial interest. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960 INT. REv. BULL. No. 5, at 17, 18.
87 The position of the Service is that "if an amount is paid during the tax-

able year [by the employer to a non-qualified plan] but the rights of the
employee therein are forfeitable at the time the amount is paid, no deduction
is allowable for any taxable year." Rev. Rul. 59-383, 1959 INT. REv. BULL.
No. 49, at 30, 31, reaffirming T.D. 5666, 1948-2 Cum. BULL. 34, 46.
88 Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960 INT. Rgv. BULL. No. 5, at 17, 23.
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A recent case refused to follow the position of the Service.
The court allowed the employer a deduction for contributions to a
funded plan in the form of employee trusts when the benefits were
actually paid although the employee's rights were forfeitable at the
time the amounts were paid into the fund. The court reasoned that,
in denying certain tax advantages to non-qualified plans, Congress
did not intend to disallow completely a deduction for the ordinary
and necessary expenses of a business.9 0 A fortiori, if a deduction is
allowed by the courts where the plan is funded through a trust, a
deduction will certainly be allowed where no trust is created but
funds are merely set aside in an account or through the purchase
of government obligations. The Service has refused to acquiesce in
this decision relying on the old Ruling that contributions to such a
plan are not deductible in any year. It is submitted that this position can be carried ad absurdum when it leads to the conclusion that
if the employee's rights are forfeitable under a non-qualified plan, no
deduction is ever allowed if the plan is funded, but a deduction is
allowed in the year of payment when the plan is unfunded. The
present situation is at least confused, and care should be taken in
adopting a deferred compensation plan.

Estate Tax on Qualified Plans, Section 2039(c)
A moving consideration in the tax liability of both qualified and
non-qualified plans are the effects of the estate tax provisions of the
92
Code. 91 Annuities are included in the gross estate of the decedent.
However, special treatment is granted to annuities paid under a
qualified plan. This preferential treatment is an express exclusion
of death benefits (annuities or other payments) paid under a qualified
plan if the beneficiary is other than the estate of the decedent. 93 This
exclusion does not apply to amounts contributed by the employee
94
The exbut applies only to amounts contributed by the employer.
clusion extends to "other payments" made under a qualified plan
extends to the proceeds from life insurance provided by the
and thus
95
plan.
The value of this special treatment for qualified plans can be
seen by a comparison with the recent case of Garber's Estate v.
89 Russell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 159 (Ct. Cl. 1959). This
case also involved profit-sharing plans.
90 Id. at 162.
91 It is no longer unusual for an employee to have an estate valued at over
the 92$60,000 statutory exemption. § 2052.
CoDE § 2039(a), (b).
93 CODE § 2039(c).
94 For example, if the employer contributed % of the cost and the employee
contributed 1/ thereof, % of the benefits under the qualified plan are absolutely
exempt from estate tax. CODE § 2039(b).
95 Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(b), example 3 (1958).
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Commissioner11 decided under the 1939 Code.9 7 Although the decedent was covered by a qualified plan,98 the value of the annuity at
his death was included in his estate for estate tax purposes. The
decision of the court was based on section 811 (a) of the 1939 Code,
which included in the decedent's gross estate all property in which
the decedent had an indefeasible right at the time of his death. 99 This
result would be different under section 2039(c) of the 1954 Code.
The fact that an employee's rights are vested will not affect this exclusion since an employee's rights must ultimately vest under a qualified plan in order for it to qualify.
It is important, in order to take advantage of this exclusion,
that the plan provide for payment to a beneficiary of the employee
in case of the employee's death to avoid payment to the employee's
estate which would cause the annuity to be included. 00
Estate Tax on Non-Qualified Plans
The 1939 Code contained no provision specifically dealing with
the estate tax liability of annuities or other payments under pension,
profit-sharing, or retirement plans of employees. 1° 1 The inclusion of
such benefits rested on the court's finding of a property interest
possessed by the employee at death. 10 2 There was some confusion
as to when a sufficient property interest existed .1 3 There was
usually an inclusion when
the employee had an unrestricted right to
04
change the beneficiary.
Under the 1954 Code, the inclusion of annuities is specifically
provided. 10 Annuities under a non-qualified or deferred compensatiorn plan are included in the gross estate if they are made "under
any form of contract or agreement" under which "an annuity or other
96 271 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1959).

1939, ch. 1, §811(a), (c), (d), (f), 53 Stat. 120-22.
Supra note 96, at 99. Although the court considered the plan a qualified

97INT.
REV. CODE OF
98

one, it may not have enjoyed a qualified status in light of present requirements.
The plan gave Garber, the employee, the right to elect not to receive any payments himself but to have all payments made to his beneficiary. Id. at 100.
But see Rev. Rul. 56-656, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 280 which denies qualified status
to a plan which allows the employee to make such an election.
09The inclusion resulted in an estate tax of $26,516.55. Id. at 99.
100 CODE § 2039(c).
101 See generally Garber's Estate v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 97 (3d Cir.
1959) ; Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1957).
102 INT. REv. CODE OF
103 Compare Goodman

1939, ch. 1, §811(a), Cc), (d), (f), 53 Stat. 120-22.
v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1957), with Glenn

v. Hanner, 212 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1954). See also Dimock v. Corwin, 19
F. 0Supp. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd, 306 U.S. 363 (1939).
1 4 G.C.M. 27242, 195-2-1 Cum. BULL. 160. But see Saxton v. Commissioner,
12 T.C. 569 (1949) (where the employee had a power of appointment but
failed
to use it).
05
1 CODE § 2039(a).
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payment was payable to the decedent, or the decedent possessed the
right to receive such annuity or payment" at the time of his
death.' 0 Includibility under this provision is determined exclusively
on the right of the decedent to receive the payment. Decedent is
considered to possess this right "so long as he had complied with
his obligations under the contract.. . up to the time of his death." 107
This includes employer's obligations to make payments which arise
by reason of the employee's death. Thus, the value of all the payments under a deferred compensation agreement would be includible."i '
The amount includible in the gross estate consists of all
of the employer's contributions made pursuant to the contract or
agreement. 109
Taxation of Employee's Beneficiary Under a Qualified Plan
The beneficiary is taxed on the payments under the plan in the
same way the employee would have been had he lived.""0 The beneficiary does not receive a basis for the payments equal to the fair
market value at the date of the decedent's death."' The payments
are taxed as an annuity under section 72 of the Code.
Section 101(b) (2) (B)
In the area of lump sum distributions, qualified plans are given
further preferential treatment by allowing the beneficiary to exclude
$5,000 of the taxable amount received."12 As distinfguished from payments under a non-qualified plan, this exclusion applies even where
the employee's rights were nonforfeitable at death."13 Where there
are a number of beneficiaries, the $5,000 exclusion is allocated among
them in the same proportion as their share bears to the total amounts
payable." 4 The exclusion is limited to a total of $5,000 for any one
decedent, and does not depend on the number of employers the decedent had."15 The provision in the 1954 Code allowing the $5,000

106 Ibid.
107 Treas. Reg. §20.2039-1(b) (ii) (1958).
108 See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960 INT. REV. Buu.. No. 5, at 17. Even if the
employee's rights are entirely forfeitable and do not become fixed at death,
payments may be includible in his gross estate if it can be proved that the
employer had nevertheless consistently made payments under such circumstances.
1o9 CODE § 2039(b).
110 CODE § 691(a). Commissioner v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1954).

M11
CODE

CODE
113 Ibid.
112

§ 1014(c).

§ 101(b) (2) (A), (B).

Treas. Reg. § 1.101-2(c) (1954).
115 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 73 (1954).
§ 1.101-2 (a) (3) (1954).
"14

Treas. Reg.
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somewhat the scope
exclusion for employee death benefits broadens
16
of the exclusion under the 1939 Code.'
The $5,000 exclusion for lump sum distributions to the beneficiary plus the preferential capital gains treatment 1 7 if paid on the
death of the employee are attractive provisions for qualified plans.
However, the distribution in the lump sum may result in a higher
tax than if the beneficiary elected to receive the payments as an
annuity over the years. Even if a higher tax does not result, there
is still the danger of unwise investment and speculation by the beneficiary, who is likely to be a widow or a child. It may be suggested,
therefore, that the employee create trusts to receive any lump sum
distributions. The payment of the benefits into more than one trust
will avoid the bunching of income into the hands of the beneficiary
alone." 8 The $5,000 exclusion is not lost since the trust qualifies
as a distributee and the total exclusion will be allocated among the
trusts. 9 Long-term capital gains treatment is also available to the
trusts."

Taxation of the Beneficiary Under Deferred Compensation Plans
With the promulgation of the new Service ruling authorizing
certain tax savings plans, 20 it is well to consider the tax effects on
death benefits under the plans. The death benefits are taxed as an
annuity under section 72.121 Under the deferred compensation plans
given favorable treatment under the ruling, the agreement may provide for the employer's obligation to make payments to arise on the
SI6NT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, §22(b) (1) (B), 53 Stat. 9, 10, allowed
the $5,000 exclusion if the amounts were paid pursuant to a contract with the
employer. See CODE § 101(b) (2) (B). See also Hess v. Commissioner, 271

F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1959).

This case shows the distinction in treatment of

qualified plans under the 1939 Code and under the 1954 Code. This case is
a companion to the case of Garber's Estate v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 97
(3d Cir. 1959), where a qualified plan was included in the employee's gross
estate on his death. In the Hess case the beneficiaries were disallowed the
$5,000 exclusion but they were allowed a deduction on their income tax for
the estate tax paid by reason of the inclusion. The result would be different
under the 1954 Code. Section 2039(c) excludes from the decedent-employee's
estate the value of any qualified plan. Thus there would be no estate tax.
Also if the payments were made in one lump sum, there would be a $5,000
exclusion under section 101(b) (2) (B).
CODE
117 The maximum rate of tax on long-term capital gains is 25%.
§ 1201 (b) (2).
118 See CODE § 662. The benefits in the hands of the trust would be considered corpus. Thus the trustee would have to be given the power in the
instrument
to draw on corpus to make distributions to the beneficiary.
9
"1 See CoDE §§ 402(a) (2), 403(a) (2).
120 Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 5, at 17.
1 If the contributions are recoverable within three years then all of the
payments received are nontaxable until the total contributions are recovered.
Thereafter all amounts received are taxable in full. CoDE § 72(d).
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death of the employee.1 22 Such payments would be on behalf of the
employer and "paid by reason of the death of the employee" and
should therefore be available for the $5,000 exclusion provided in
section 101 (b). Where contingencies are provided in the contract,
it could not be said that the employee possessed an immediate right
to receive payments while living 123 since the obligation to pay arose
only by reason of his death. The $5,000 exclusion should therefore
become effective. This exclusion applies whether or not there is a
lump sum distribution, unlike the qualified plan. 1 24 The exclusion
is treated the same as an investment in the contract and a proporof the
tionate amount would be excluded from the gross 1income
25
beneficiary in each year when distributions are made.
The foregoing discussion assumed that the right to receive distributions arose solely by reason of the death of the employee. However, under either of the plans whether contingencies were provided
for or not, if the distributions became payable during the life of the
employee as provided by the contract, the $5,000 exclusion would
not be available to the beneficiary. Thus if the employee had the
right to receive payments or was receiving payments because he became disabled, or reached age 60, he would be considered to have
had a nonforfeitable right to receive the payments while living and
the exclusion would not apply.' 2 6 Under the Regulations, however,
the nonforfeitable right applies only to the present value of the death
benefits immediately before the employee's death.1 2 7 Where the
amounts to be paid at the employee's death are fixed, then the present
value will be the total amount. But, where the amounts to be paid
to the beneficiary are greater than the present value to which the
employee had a nonforfeitable right immediately prior to his death,
then the $5,00028exclusion applies to the amounts above the employee's
present value.'
There is no long-term capital gains treatment available for lump
sum distributions as in the qualified plans. 129 However, there is a
Code provision allowing the lump sum distributions of annuities to
be taxed over a three-year spread. 130 This provision allowing for
the three-year tax spread is not available for the employees or beneSupra note 120, at 18.
§ 101(b) (2) (B).
124 Ibid.
122
123 CODE
125 CODE
126 CODE

§72(b).
§ 101(b) (2) (B).

See also Treas. Reg. § 1.101-2(d) (2), example 1
(1954).
(1954).
127 Treas. Reg. § 1.101-2(d) (ii)
128 Treas. Reg. § 1.101-2(d) (2), examples 3, 4, 5. The simplest example of
this is where the payments are to be a certain amount per year for the life
of the beneficiary and the life expectancy of the surviving widow exceeds
what the normal life expectancy of the employee was.
129 CODE §§ 402(a) (2), 403(a) (2).
130 CODE § 72(e) (3).

NOTES

1960 ]

ficiaries under qualified plans. 131 There is no similar restriction for
non-qualified plans. Thus the three-year tax spread may be available to deferred compensation plans if they are considered an annuity
within the purview of section 72.
On the death of the employee, the value of these annuity payments is included in his gross estate for estate tax purposes. 132 In
order to avoid a double tax on these payments when received by the
beneficiary, he is entitled to an income tax deduction for the estate
tax paid by reason of the inclusion. 133
Conclusion
A comparison of qualified and non-qualified plans will serve as
a capsule review of this article. The variety of benefits to the employee and his beneficiary under a qualified plan are as follows:
(1) The employee is not taxed presently on the contributions to the
plan; (2) the employee is taxed in the year of receipt when his
productive capacity has declined; (3) long-term capital gains treatment is available to the employee and his beneficiary on lump sum
distributions; (4) any unrealized appreciation in the value of any
employer's securities distributed are not taxable to the employee on
distribution; (5) the value of the benefits is excluded from the
decedent-employee's gross estate; (6) a $5,000 exclusion is available
to the beneficiary if the benefits become payable in one lump sum.
For the employer, besides fostering good employee relations, the tax
advantages provided are (1) a current deduction for contributions
to the plan, and (2) the income of the trust established to administer
the plan is exempt from tax.
Advantages are now sanctioned for deferred compensation plans
that are not qualified under the Code. This is perhaps a recognition
that the executive has a difficult time providing for his old age. The
benefits to the executive under a deferred compensation agreement
are as follows: (1) He is not currently taxed on any credits or
contributions; (2) he is taxed in the year of receipt when his income has declined; (3) a three-year tax spread may be available
for lump sum distributions; (4) the value of the benefits is included
in his gross estate on death but an income tax deduction is provided
for his beneficiary for the estate tax paid by reason of the inclusion;
(5) a $5,000 exclusion may be available to the beneficiary if the
executive died before the distributions became payable; (6) a $5,000
exclusion is available if the amounts which the beneficiary may receive are in excess of the present value of the amounts to which the
employee had a nonforfeitable right at death.
131 CoDE
132 CODE
3
13 CODE

§ 402(a).
§ 2039(a).
§ 691(c).
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The ruling authorizing deferred compensation plans will be
appreciated by business. It is hoped that the plans adopted will be
bona fide arrangements to provide benefits on retirement, death, or
disability.

THE

PROBLEM OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN

ADMINISTRATIVE

HEARINGS AND DEPARTMENTAL TRIALS

Both the federal and New York jurisdictions agree that the
findings of fact made by a quasi-judicial administrative board are
subject to judicial scrutiny in that the reviewing court must determine whether the facts found are supported in the record by "substantial evidence." The concept of substantial evidence, referred to
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter as an "undefined defining" 1 term, is of
necessity and of legislative design an elastic one. After a preliminary
consideration of the general scope of the substantial evidence rule,
this note will concern itself with the extent to which this elastic concept of review encompasses an examination of the credibility of the
witnesses before the board.
The Federal Concept
The federal statute generally determinative of the scope of judicial review of administrative findings of fact is Section 10(e) of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 2 This section reads in pertinent part:
Except so far as as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action
is by law committed to agency discretion(e) Scope of Review.... [T]he reviewing court shall ... (B) hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... (5)
unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to the requirements
2 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 747, 489 (1951).
260 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) 1958). In rare instances,
judicial review of an administrative finding of fact includes a determination
de novo of the disputed fact. For cases involving a "jurisdictional" fact,
where the Supreme Court held that protection of a constitutional right necessitated court determination of the facts, see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932) (whether, in a claim under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, the injury occurred upon the navigable waters of the
United States and whether the relationship of master and servant existed in
the maritime employment); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922)
(whether a person under order of deportation is a citizen).

